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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Freud's (1900/1967, p. 284, footnote)
reference to Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of the role of unnoticed stimuli in dream formation, many psychoanalysts have
viewed subliminal perception as an important research
method.

For example, Klein (1959, 1967) used the method to

investigate the differential effects of peripheral versus
focal awareness of stimuli and ideas.

Her€, inputting

stimuli at subliminal levels was view€d as a means to
manipulate peripheral trains of thought.

Pine (1964) noted

that in many studies, the effect of a subliminal stimulus
was often indirectly or symbolically related to the stimulus content.

These transformations of subliminal stimuli

were thought to result from primary process thinking (i.e.,
use of condensation, symbolization, and displacement).

For

these authors, subliminal perception was seen as a powerful tool for studying cognitive processes

h~pothesized

to

occur at unconscious or preconscious levels.
More recently, Lloyd Silverman and his associates
at New York University have published over twenty-five
studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) usin9 a laboratory
1
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technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic activation."
These studies typically present some wish- or conflictrelated stimulus at subliminal levels and compare its
effect on behavior to that of some (relatively) neutral
stimulus.

Relationships between particular unconscious

conflicts and psychopathologies hypothesized by psychoanalysts have been investigated with this method.
example, Silverman and Silverman (1967)

For

found that sub-

liminal presentation of stimuli containing

~ggressive

content resulted in increases in measured thought disorder
in a group of schizophrenics.

Predicted results have also

been obtained with groups of depressives

(Rutstein &

Goldberger, 1973), stutterers (Silverman, Klinger, Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972), homosexual males (Silverman,
Kwawer, Wolitzky, & Caron, 1973), insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger, 1974) and overweight women (Silverman, Martin,

Ungar~

& Mendelsohn, 1978).

In a review of

his work, Silverman (1976) concludes that the results offer
strong support for the psychoanalytic notion that conflicts
occurring below awareness can account for many specific
symptomatologies.

Given the complexity o£ many of the

stimuli used and the wide range of behavioral effects
observed, these results are not easily explained by most
current theories of visual information processing (e.g.,
Neisser, 1967).
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive
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research from Silverman's laboratory, ·the few independent
replications of his work found in the literature have
obtained disappointing results (Greenberg, 1917; Emmelkamp

& Straatman, 1976).

In an attempt to encourage replication

and to demonstrate the effects of the method on a type of
behavior not previously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler
and Lustig (1978} report results of four experiments using
a relatively simple methodology and college males as subjects.

The major intention of each experiment was to manipu-

late, through subliminal presentation of conflict-related
material, the degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects
and to observe the effects of this on subjects' accuracy
in dart-throwing competition.

Thus, the study purports to

test the psychoanalytic proposition that males can unconsciously inhibit themselves in competitive performance
because winning has the hidden connotation of defeating
father for mother's love {Beisser, 1961).

The_ goal of the

first part of the present investigation is to replicate
as exactly as possible the major parts of this study.
In order to better understand the psychological
processes involved in this phenomenon 1 the second part of
the present study will extend the original findings to
investigate which elements of the original stimuli are
necessary to produce the experimental effects.

To test

whether the specifically oedipal elements of the stimuli
are essential, reference to defeating father will be
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eliminated in a further set of stimuli.

Finally, reference

to competition will be eliminated and only a non-specific
behavioral injunction included in an additional set of
stimuli.

These procedures provide a partial test of Silver-

man's hypothesis that activation of an unconscious oedipal
conflict is necessary to explain the results of the original
experiments.
In order to place Silverman's research program in
historical perspective, earlier studies using the subliminal
perception paradigm to test various psychoanalytic propositions are reviewed in the following section.

This is fol-

lowed by a summary of methodological and theoretical
criticisms of the paradigm and then a critical review of
Silverman's work.

Methods and results of the current study

are presented in subsequent sections.

Finally, results

are discussed as they bear on issues in subliminal perception research, visual information processing, and psychoanalytic personality theory.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERA'I'URE
Dixon {1971) has traced the notion of subliminal
perception to the writings of Dernocritus, Plato, and
Aristotle.

Systematic research is generally considered to

have begun with Suslowa's (1863; cited by Wolitzky &
Wachtel, 1973) study of the effects of weak electrical
stimulation upon the two-point thresholdr and Pierce and
Jastrow's (1884; cited by Dixon, 1971) finding that subjects judged weights at a better than chance rate even when
they expressed no subjective confidence in their judgments.
Guided by Freud's notion of the role of day residue in
dream formation, Poetzl (1917/1960) published an important
study in which subjects were exposed to pictures of landscapes tachistoscopically and asked to draw and describe
what they had seen.

Parts of the stimulus that were un-

noticed following tachistoscopic exposure £reguently
appeared in the content of subjects' dreams later that
night.

Except for replications of Poetzl's study by

Malamud and Linder (1931} and Allers and Telers (1924/1960},
little was published in the area until the 1950s.
The voluminous literature on subliminal perception

5
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published since that time can be divided into three main
lines of investigation (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973).

The

first line of research, usually undertaken within the
orientation of psychophysics or signal detection theory,
attempts to determine the information-processing limits of
the perceptual apparatus.

Bevan's (1964) experiments on

the effect of subliminal anchors upon psychophysical judgments are typical of this research.

A second line has

grown from the classical conditioning paradigm.

These

studies usually look at verbal conditioning without awareness, focusing largely on establishing experimental
analogues of therapeutically effective learning (e.g.,
Greenspoon, 1955; Spielberger, 1962).

These two areas of

research have been periodically reviewed (Adams, 1957;
McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil_, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Dixon, 1971)
and so will not be considered here.
The third line of research stems largely from "Ne\v
Look" approaches to perception.

Beginning with HcGinnies

(1949) report that taboo words had elevated recognition
thresholds compared to other words, many studies followed
which investigated the relationship between perception and
personality processes.

Much of this research was guided

by psychoanalytic notions of preconscious and unconscious
thinking, primary and secondary process thinking, and conflict and defense.

For example, recent work by Erdelyi and

Kleinbard (1978) and Erdelyi and Goldberg (in press) bears
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on psychoanalytic notions of repression and the retrievability of lost ("unconscious") memories.
Among New Look investigations using a subliminal
perception paradigm, perhaps the theoretical and empirical
work of George Klein (1959, 1967) is most significant.
Klein (1970) was interested in the issue of the differential
effects of peripheral versus focal awareness of stimuli and
ideas.

He proposed the model of "schema activation"

(Klein

& Holt, 1960) by which subliminal or incidental inputs are
likely to activate drive-related ideas and lead to behavioral
effects under certain subject and stimulus conditions.

As

will be seen, Silverman's (1976) recent work on "subliminal
psychodynamic activation" appears closely related to ideas
advanced by Klein.

Before considering Silverman's research

program however, a partial review of studies

usi~g

the

subliminal perception paradigm to test various psycho,.
analytic hypotheses and a consideration of methodological
and theoretical criticisms of the paradigm are advanced.
Psychoanalytic Theory and Subliminal
Perception Research
As Pine (1964) notes, a major reason for interest
in the effects of subliminal or incidental (outside focal
awareness) stimuli has been the hope that this research
would permit controlled study of thought processes operating
outside of awareness.

Much of the research was guided by

the notions of primary and secondary process thinking and
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the role of day residue in dream formation advanced by
Freud (1900/1967, Chapter VII).

In order to study the

workings of these hypothesized processes, several different
methods for presenting stimuli have been used.

In some

studies {e.g., Pine, 1961), the critical stimuli are presented at above threshold intensities, while the subjects'
attention is diverted to a separate focal task.

As stimuli

are not presented at a level below an independently determined threshold, this method is more properly termed "incidental" stimulation {see Dixon, 1971, for further discussion).
Other studies (e.g., Klein, Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch,
1958) have used a backward masking method involving exposure
of one (A) stimulus immediately followed by exposure of
another (B) stimulus which is supraliminal.

The effect of

the unreported A-stimulus on subjects' reactions to the
B-stimulus is analyzed.

The most frequently used method

involves presentation of stimuli at intensities or durations
below some independently determined threshold of awareness
(e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; all of Silverman's work).
Early research in the area (reviewed by Pine, 1964) appears
based on the assumption that stimuli presented by any of
these methods would bypass the mechanisms that govern the
intake of supraliminal stimuli.

Being less subject to

critical judgment and inhibitory control, these stimuli
were assumed to more directly effect preconscious and primary process mental events.

By looking at the influence of
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these stimuli on behavior, it was hoped that the workings
of these thought processes would become more clear.
Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) note that the influence
of subliminal stimulation has been demonstrated on a wide
variety of behaviors including:

trait attributions (Klein,

Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch, 1958; Eagle, 1959i Smith,
Spence, & Kelin, 1959), drawings (Klein, et al., 1958),
guessing (Spence, 1961), reaction time (Spence & Bressler,
1962), visual illusions (Smith & Henriksson, 1955), bias
in intentional recall (Spence & Holland, 1962; Spence,
1964), TAT-like stories (Pine, 1960, 1961), Rorschach content (Silverman & Silverman, 1964), and formal aspects of
thought (Silverman, 1967).

1

The influence of subliminal stimulation on dreams,
images, and free associations has probably been most extensively studied.

In the first study on this topic, Poetzl

{1917/1960) exposed pictures of landscapes tachistoscopically
for about 1/100 of a second and asked subjects to draw and
describe what they had seen.

Poetzl found that parts of

the stimulus that were unnoticed following tachistoscope
exposure tended to appear later in dream content.

Allers

and Teler (1924/1960) extended Poetzl's findings using free1 Given the large number of studies to be discussed,
no attempt will be made here to analyze individual studies
on methodological or theoretical grounds.
Instead, criticisms applicable to many of the studies are discussed in the
following section. Then, the work of Silverman is critically
examined in some detail.
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association and imagery tasks the day following stimulus
exposure.
Since then, a number of investigators have pursued
these findings further.

Fisher (1954) showed that unnoticed

parts of tachistoscopically presented pictures tended to
appear in dreams and suggested that these stimulus elements
were influenced by unconscious wishes and primary-process
transformations.

Using more rigorous techniques of threshold

measurement, scoring criteria, and statistical analysis, he
later demonstrated the effect of subliminal stimuli on both
dream and image content (Fisher & Paul, l959i Paul & Fisher,
1959).

Shevrin and Lubarsky (1958) reported supporting

evidence and found that noticed aspects of the stimuli were
also included in dreams.
Eriksen (1960) criticized the foregoing studies for
ignoring the issue of base rates for appearance of ideas in
fantasy without prior stimulation.

A related problem is__

that if a subject perceives even only one element of the
stimulus correctly (e.g., a boat), he is bound to fantasy
other objects (e.g., a lake, pier} normally associated with
the perceived object.

As some of these associated objects

are likely to have been in the original picture, a spurious
"emergence" effect may arise which has nothing to do with
below-threshold perception of the previously unreported
elements.

Eriksen also notes that subjects may have dif-

ferent criteria for reporting what they saw right after
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exposure and for reports following an imagery task.

Thus,

"recovery" effects may reflect only a lower confidence
criterion for report.

Incorporating some of the controls

suggested by Eriksen (1960), Hilgard {1962) investigated
whether fantasy experience might facilitate recovery of
initially unreported elements in a post-fantasy intentional
recall task.

Ambiguous results were obtained as judges

rarely had great assurance that genuine recoveries were
being scored.

Johnson and Eriksen (1961) obtained no sub-

liminal recovery effect in a replication of the Shevrin and
Lubarsky

~1958)

study with controls for base-rate production

of stimulus related ideas.

Dixon (1971) argues however that

this failure to replicate may be due to the limited opportunities subjects had to demonstrate recovery.
In carefully controlled studies which appear to
have met Eriksen's (1960) criticisms, Giddan (1967) and
Haber and Erdelyi (1967) demonstrated subjects' recovery
of initially unavailable material.

In the Haber and

Erdelyi study, the experimental group saw a picture briefly,
attempted to recall it, then gave extensive free associations, followed by a second recall attempt.
groups were used.

Two control

A "dart-control" group played darts

instead of free associating, and a "yoked-control" group
was shown the initial recall attempts of experimental subjects rather than the original stimuli, and then treated
identically to the experimental group.

Comparisons of
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initial and post-association recall drawings shovled that
the improvement in recall of the experimental group was
superior to that of either control group, indicating that
free associations resulted in the recovery of initially
unavailable material.

The results were taken to support

the psychoanalytic hypothesis that below-conscious psychic
material continues to influence and manifest itself in a
variety of behaviors.

They also support the therapeutic

claim that free-association (or other fantasy production
techniques) aids in the recovery of below-conscious material.
In the same vein, Erdelyi's more recent work (e.g., Erdelyi

& Kleinbard, 1978) has focused on the growth of recall for
pictures (and not words) over periods of up to one week
after initial stimulus presentation.
The foregoing studies on recovery of initially unavailable material stem originally from Freud's {1900/1967)
theory of the role of day residue (unnoticed stimuli) in
dream formation.

Here, barely noticed, unassimilated

sensory impressions of the day are "selected 11 for dream
content because of their resonance with unconscious wishes.
They emerge in the dream as derivative representations of
the wish owing to the requirements of censorship and nature
of unconscious thinking.

A somewhat different perspective

for looking at subliminal perception research stems loosely
from Freud's (1900/1967, 1911/1958) distinction between
primary process (primitive, non-logical, and drive-
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dominated) and secondary process {intentional, realityoriented) thinking.

Klein's (1959, 1967) work on the inter-

action of central and peripheral trains of thought reflects
this perspective.

For Klein (1967), an important problem

was specifying the conditions under which peripheral ideation will intrude upon or become incorporated into conscious,
intentional thinking.

He hoped to shed light on the role of

consciousness in thinking (Klein & Holt, 1960) and to
specify the conditions determining behavioral effects of
peripherally aroused trains of thought.

Assuming that

subliminal stimulation would arouse peripheral trains of
thought, the strategy here was to compare the effects of
subliminal or incidental stimuli to those of supraliminal
or focal stimuli.
Examination of studies which directly compare rthe
effects of subliminal and supraliminal stimulation gives
no clear-cut answer to the question of whether and how
these effects differ.

As noted earlier, Poetzl's (1917/

1960) claim that unnoticed stimuli were more likely than
noticed stimuli to appear in subsequent dreams was refuted
by Shevrin and Luborsky (1958).

Fisher {1960) presents

evidence suggesting that inclusion of a stimulus in a
dream is a complex interaction between awareness versus
nonawareness of the stimulus, subject's conflicts and
defenses, and meaning of the stimulus to the subject.
Similarly, Spence and Ehrenberg (1964) found that food
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deprivation was the key variable related to bias in recall,
whether the stimulus "cheese" was presented above or below
threshold.
r--------,

Discussing the range of subliminal effects, Pine
(1964} introduced the distinction between "direct" and
"indirect" effects of stimuli.

Direct effects are those

that appear to have a relatively close or logical relationship to the initial stimulus, though are not literal
replicas

o!

it.

For example, Zuckerman (1960) found that

subliminal presentation of the messages "write more" or
"don't write" resulted in significantly longer or shorter
TAT stories.

Interestingly, supraliminal presentations of

the stimuli produced no consistent differences in story
lengths.

Here, it appears that supraliminal stimuli can

be used as appropriate or discarded as irrelevant depending
on the subject's intentions.

Smith, Spence and Klein

(1959) presented either the word "happy" or "angry" masked
by a supraliminal picture of a face that was affectively
neutral.

The stimulus words biased responses towards more

positive or more negative descriptions of the face, though
the words themselves were rarely used in descriptions.
Instead, common associates and words logically related to
the stimulus words were often used, while remote symbolic
associates were not.
Indirect effects are those which 9rfe not obviously
related to the initial stimulus.

They include symbolic

'
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transformations of the original stimulus and often suggest
primary process thinking (i.e., use of condensation,
symbolization, displacement).

Pine (1960) illustrated

ind1rect effects in a study where subjects read a focal
passage while overhearing another passage read in an
adjacent room (incidental stimulus).

Though the focal

passage (emphasizing the phallic-aggressive aspects of a
hook) influenced subsequent TAT stories in an undistorted
manner, the incidental passage (emphasizing the oral-passive
aspects of a cow) emerged in an indirect, distorted manner.
Indirect effects included an increase in themes of passive
and nurturant human relationships, but not an increase in
cow-like content.

Reviewing this issue, Wol\itzky and

Wachtel (1973) conclude that while indirect effects are
less likely with supraliminal stimuli, subliminal stimuli
can give rise to both direct and indirect effects given
appropriate respons·e measures.

The issue of the differen-

tial effects of subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli
appears to be a complex one probably involving other
variables such as subjects' current drive state and intentional set.
Numerous other studies have investigated subject
variables and stimulus conditions which facilitate or
inhibit subliminal effects.

These have been recently

reviewed by Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) and by Dixon (1971)
who concludes that subliminal effects are facilitated when
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subjects are in a low state of arousal, attention is
unselective or broadened, and cognitions are intuitive,
global, symbolic, and unbound by logical restraints.

These

conclusions have recently been complicated by Sackeim,
Packer, and Gur's (1977) report of an interaction between
hemisphericity and induced cognitive set ("intuitive" or
"analytic") on subliminal effects.
Of the models advanced by various psychoanalytic
writers to explain these results, the most representative
is the "schema activation" model proposed by Klein and
Holt (1960).

They define a schema as an organized group of

memory traces, including both conceptual associates and
drive-related derivatives.

They assume that every perceptual

process includes scanning of memory schemata so that incoming stimuli can be recognized and take on meaning.
Further, any schema may be activated by:
anticipations,

(a) sets or

(b) the scanning process that selects traces

which match incoming stimuli, and (c) connections to drives.
The results of Poetzl (1917/1960) and followers are interpreted by Klein and Holt to indicate that stimuli can
activate relevant schema and lead to behavioral effects even
if they are not consciously noticed.

Stimuli that make

contact with an active drive schema seem to have an advantage for recovery.

They note that in masking studies, the

first or A-stimulus will activate certain schemas.

If these

are relevant to some ambiguous property of the second or
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B-stimulus, reactions to the second stimulus will be biased.
If the stimulus is a brief flash, the authors write that it
may emerge into imagery if the subject can suspend realistic, problem-oriented thinking.

Thus, schema activated

by the stimulus become more available relative to other
schema.
The foregoing model is part of a larger theoretical
framework (Klein, 1967) which assumes that in addition to
conscious concerns and focal intentions, there are concurrent trains of thought in a state of activation that also
make claims on response channels.

In so far as subliminal

or incidental stimulation can be considered to activate
these peripheral trains of thought, the method offers a way
to study their emergence in various response channels.
Critiques of the Subliminal
Perception Paradigm
Many of the studies reviewed above could have been
criticized on various grounds, the most common being small
sample size, weak or ambiguous results, and lack of independent replication.

In addition, many studies fail to

report relevant details such as illumination levels, stimulus size and contrast, method for determining threshold,
and length of dark adaption.

Because of these problems and

an unknown number of negative results, the results of these
studies must be regarded as tentative and interpreted with
caution.

The sequence of subliminal studies suggests that

18

researchers are often dissatisiied with weak results, think
of some possible mediating variable and control for it in a
subsequent study.

Even if positive results are then

obtained, systematic investigations of the new variable and
replications are rarely reported.

This apparent pattern

has resulted in a plethora of variables possibly relevant
to subliminal effects with little systematic knowledge about
any one.
the

Further, little attention is paid to establishing

reliab~lity

of earlier studies.

Although there has

recently been increased acceptance of the phenomenon due to
use of signal detection techniques and persuasive theoretical
accounts (e.g., Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974; Walker, 1978},
some writers continue to question the validity of the concept (e.g., Neisser, 1967; Wiener & Kleespies, 1968).
Before discussing the research program of Silverman
and associates, it will be helpful to review the major
methodological and theoretical criticims that have been
directed towards subliminal perception research.

The pur-

pose here is not to evaluate the overall validity of the
paradigm (see Dixon, 1971) but to lay the groundwork for
judging the merits of a particular research program.
In his review of the literature on discrimination
and learning without awareness, Eriksen (1960) notes that
terms like "conscious," "unconscious," and "awareness" are
often defined differently across studies.

Especially impor-

tant to studies using an absolute threshold paradigm is the
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operational definition of threshold of awareness.

Eriksen

notes that this is usually defined in terms of subjects'
verbal report, thus placing a burden on the adequacy of
the language to reflect the richness of perceptual experience.

Thus, the threshold of a given subject depends on

several variables, including:

adequacy of the experimenter's

questions, use or lack of use of a ready signal, whether or
not a forced-choice format is employed, and the adequacy of
the scale used to classify subjects' answers.

He suggests

that drawings or use of forced-choice methods may reveal
that subjects are aware of more than they can verbally
report.
Bevan (1964) and Eriksen (1960) note that threshold
is a statistical estimate of something that varies over time
and is commonly defined as the point at which a subject correctly discriminates (either a stimulus from a blank field
or one stimulus from another) at a 50 percent rate.

Because

of this, subjects may sometimes be aware of the stimulus
even when presented below this level.

This could create

the false impression of a subliminal effect.

Clearly, the

subliminal stimulus should be presented at a level below the
range of values from which the threshold was derived.

In

response to these cogent criticisms and suggestions for
determining threshold, many recent studies (e.g., Zwosta &
Zenhausern, 1969) have employed more rigorous threshold procedures using signal detection techniques to separate sensitivity from criterion factors.
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Studies using a masking paradigm have also been
criticized by Eriksen (1960) for rarely including careful
threshold determinations {e.g., Smith, Spence, & Klein,
1958).

He notes that in the study cited, some control sub-

jects alerted to the fact that words would be flashed prior
to the picture were able to detect the A-stimulus.

Neisser

(1967) criticizes the backward masking paradigm on evolutionary grounds.

Given the specialized nature and unusual-

ness of backward masking, he doubts that evolution would
have

~pped

the mind with unconscious mechanisms for

dealing with it.

Dixon (1971) counters this argument

claiming that natural selection probably favored organisms
losing the least information from the environment.
Neisser (1967) also criticizes the Smith,

et al.

(1958) study for the possibility that "demand characteristics" were operating.

In particular, he points out that

the experimenter may have known the order of the A-stimulus
exposures and so influenced subjects' reports of the Bstimulus accordingly.

In the same vein, he criticizes

studies using free association measures where the experimenter knows which are the critical cue words.

Significant

here is the attempted replication of Spence (1964) by Bruel,
Ginsberg, Lukomnik, and Schmeidler (1966).

Using the same

free association task as the original experiment, they
obtained non-significant results when using an experimenter
naive to the hypothesis.

However, an informed experimenter
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instructed to emphasize the critical cue words also obtained
non-significant results.

As Dixon (1971) notes, the

mechanisms underlying the alleged operation of "demand characteristics" in these studies are unknown and may involve
communication processes on the same order of mysteriousness
as subliminal perception.

In any event, experimental con-

trols guarding against this possibility are necessary for
straightforward interpretation of results.
Perhaps the most cogent criticism (at least the most
publically debated) of the subliminal perception paradigm
is that the availability of partial stimulus cues may
account for the observed effects.

Advanced by Goldiamond

(1958) and Eriksen (1960) as a possible explanation of perceptual defense studies, the position is stated most clearly
by Kempler and Wiener (1963).

The later authors draw a dis-

tinction between one-process and two-process views of perception.

Briefly, the two-process view (their example,

Klein, et al., 1958) assumes the existence of two relatively
independent perceptual processes; a supraliminal one operating within awareness and a subliminal one operating outside awareness.

Further, the subliminal process can make

affective or evaluative reactions to the stimulus before
the subject can discriminate and report it.

Thus, the

meaning of a stimulus is apprehended prior to correct recognition.

The one-process view posits a single perceptual

process described by a monotonic relationship between
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stimulus intensity or duration and response strength.

Thus,

lowered stimulus intensity will lead to impoverished
responses, but is not expected to produce qualitatively different responses.

Kempler and Wiener argue that, in studies

obtaining subliminal effects, refined threshold procedures
would reveal the availability of partial cues to which subjects respond in a predictable manner.

Differences in

response to weak inputs are seen by the authors as "a function of differential response characteristics of a subject
(or between subjects) to the specific seen part cues (1963,
p. 352, their emphasis)."
Guthrie and Wiener (1966) offered empirical evidence
for the "part-cue response-characteristic" model as a
tenable explanation of results obtained by Eagle (1959).
Eagle used the masking paradigm in which either an aggressive or benevolent picture was immediately followed by
supraliminal exposure of a neutral picture.

Subjects'

ratings of the neutral picture varied syst.ematically with
the different masked stimuli.

Noting that the two masked

stimuli appeared to vary in structural attributes as well
as in content, Guthrie and Wiener asked subjects to rate
supraliminal presentations of line drawings varying in
angularity and line thickness.

As predicted, angular lines

were rated negatively while curved lines were rated positively.

To show that this structural cue may have been

available to Eagle's subjects, they demonstrated that sub-
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jects rated the original aggressive stimulus as more angular
than the benevolent stimulus when presented in an ascending
series (starting below threshold).

Finally, they constructed

stimuli which varied in angularity and thematic content
(presence or absence of a gun) and presented these as
stimuli masked by an ambiguous supraliminal stimulus.

As

predicted, subjects' ratings of the ambiguous stimulus
varied significantly with the angularity of the masked
stimulus and not with the presence or absence of the gun.
In addition, the closer to recognition threshold the angular
masked stimulus was presented, the more negative ratings
were given.

The authors conclude that predictable differences

in response to available structural cues can account for the
behavior ascribed to subliminal perception.
Responding to this study, Silverman and Spiro (1967)
collected subjects' ratings of angularity of aggressive and
neutral stimuli used in earlier studies which obtained predicted subliminal effects (e.g., Silverman, 1965).

For

both exposures in ascending series and at durations used
in the experiments proper, the aggressive stimuli were
never judged to be significantly more angular than the
neutral stimuli.

In three comparisons, neutral stimuli

were judged more angular, contrary to Guthrie and Wiener's
{1966) findings.

Silverman and Spiro also note several

studies (e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; Fiss, Goldberger, &
Klein, 1963; Silverman & Silverman, 1964) that employed a
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"discrimination task" in response to the partial-cue criticisms of Eriksen (1960) and others.

In this task, experi-

mental and control stimuli are presented randomly under the
same tachistoscopic conditions as they were in the experiment proper and the subject's task is to tell them apart
(without having to identify them).

If stimuli are yielding

different partial cues, a better than chance discrimination
presumably should be made.

Though significant subliminal

effects were obtained in these studies, almost no subjects
were able to make this discrimination.

Silverman and Spiro

report that the subjects who could make the discrimination
tended to show less subliminal effect than the majority
who could not.

Additionally, they cite a study by Spence

and Holland (1962) which suggested that the availability of
partial-cues significantly interfered with subliminal
effects.
In a somewhat philosophical rejoinder, Wiener and
Kleespies (1968) argue that one can never "prove" that somP
supraliminal cues are not available.

Their position states

that some cues are available, not necessarily angularity,
which could account for observed effects.

Finally, Silver-

man (1968) replies by claiming that part-cue adherents need
to demonstrate structural differences between pairs of
neutral and critical stimuli and also that these differences
are likely to emerge during the experiment proper (e.g.,
by a "discrimination task").

Clearly, part-cue theory has
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difficulty explaining how subjects can react differently to
supraliminal cues of two stimuli when they are unable to
tell whether the stimuli are the same or different.
The final criticism of the subliminal perception
paradigm to be considered is that it implies some sort of
"pre-perceiver" or "little-man-inside-the-head" that perceives and reacts to stimuli before they are consciously
experienced.

This debate appears to stem from different

orientations towards psychology and semantic biases.

For

example, Eriksen's (1960) implication of a "superdiscriminating unconscious" seems to imply more of a homunculus than
does Dixon's (1971, p. 90} "antecedent physiological
processes which do not have phenomenal representation."
Erdelyi (1974} suggests that this problem is ameliorated if
the phenomenon is understood in information-processing
terms.

He argues:

that a system with control processes for internal regulation, including regulation of input, violates no
sacrosanct edict of science, nor does it imply the
literal existence of little men or demons in the head
(1974

I

P· 4).

Acceptance of these sorts of internal control
processes does not imply acceptance of subliminal perception however.

Neisser (1967) argues that the pre-attentive

processes implicated by this view are cruder and less
accurate than focal ones and so could not be expected to
operate at an input level below that for attentive (i.e.,
conscious) processes.

For the same reason, they could not
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be expected to recognize and react to the meaning of stimuli
prior to conscious recognition.

The results of some sub-

liminal studies (particularly those of Silverman) certainly
do implicate some very complex and accurate processes
occurring at below conscious levels.

To account for these

results, Dixon (1971) offers an information-processing model
involving multiple inputs giving rise to preconscious
parallel processing.

Following a microgenetic view of per-

ception (Werner, 1948), he posits a stage in perceptual
processing where meaning is extracted while naming is impossible.

As additional evidence of this stage, he offers

observations of aphasics who clearly recognize but cannot
name objects.

He suggests that impoverished stimulation,

as well as cortical damage, may operate to stop perceptual
processing at this preconscious level.
In conclusion, the debate over subliminal perception
has ranged across many psychological viewpoints for more
than two decades.

Perhaps the primary reason for the abun-

dance of debate is the frequency of poorly controlled
studies which show weak or ambiguous subliminal effects.
This is complicated by the apparently small range of stimulus
values between which the phenomenon is demonstrable (Hilgard,
1962).

Secondly, the idea of subliminal perception has

often appeared to contradict common sense notions of perception (e.g., "If I cannot see it, I cannot react to it.")
and many epistemological assumptions about perception and
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behavior (e.g., Wiener & Kleespies'
ception" position).

[1968] "realism in per-

Nonetheless, the paradigm has gained

increasing acceptance as theoretical viewpoints have changed
(Dixon, 1971) and the part-processes hypothetically underlying the phenomenon are better understood (e.g., Moray,
1970).

How several of the criticisms mentioned above apply

to the research program of Silverman and associates will be
examined in the following section.
Silverman's Research on
"Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation"
Within the context of attempts to clarify and validate some aspects of psychoanalytic theory, Silverman and his
collaborators at New York University have published over
twenty-five studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) using
a laboratory technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic
activation."

The theory behind this technique derives from

Freud's model of unconscious conflict and defense as they
relate to psychopathological symptomatology.

Following

Klein and Holt's (1960) emphasis on the importance of the
drive-relevance of subliminal stimuli, Silverman (1976)
assumes that a stimulus containing wish-related content
makes contact with derivatives of the related wish if the
wish is currently active in the person.

Thus, the sub-

liminal input produces an effect analagous to that of an
internally generated increase in intensity of an unconscious
wish.

In line with Pine's (1964) notion of indirect sub-
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liminal effects and the theory of psychodynamic defenses,
Silverman argues that the ideas and images activated by
this input are likely to be transformed so that their wishrelated character is obscured.

They are thus not expected

to directly come into awareness but rather to press for
expression without the person's awareness.

For Silverman,

this is evidenced by increases or decreases in the psychopathological symptoms related to the unconscious wish, the
direction depending on whether the stimulus has conflictintensifying or conflict-alleviating connotations.
The idea of activation of an unconscious wish or
conflict suggests that the pr~sent paradigm is closely
related to the more comprehensive "schema activation" model
proposed by Klein and Holt (1960).

As noted earlier,

Klein's (1970) programmatic research interest was to explore
the interactions between peripheral and focal trains of
thought.

His work was directed towards understanding the

cognitive and perceptual processes involved and specifying
the conditions under which an incidental input effects
behavior and conscious experience.

In contrast, Silverman

(1977) appears to implic 1itly accept a model of how subliminal input can affect behavior and goes on to use the
technique to test specific hypotheses about psychopathology.
His goal has been to validate and clarify psychoanalytic
propositions relating particular symptoms (e.g., depression)
to particular unconscious conflicts (e.g., aggression turned
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towards the self).

Before looking at the results of this

research, the experimental method is reviewed.
Essentially, the effect on psychopathological
behavior of subliminal presentation of wish-related stimuli
is compared to that of subliminal presentation of (relatively) neutral stimuli.
11

Sessions typically begin with a

baseline" assessment of subjects' propensity for whatever

behavior is being studied.
tachist~scopic

stimuli.

This is followed by 4-msec

exposures to conflict-related or neutral

Both pictorial and verbal stimuli are shown four

times for each condition and both experimenter and subject
are blind to stimulus content.

A re-assessment of patho-

logical behavior follows the tachistoscope presentations.
This procedure is repeated for other neutral and critical
stimuli in the same session or the next day.

Silverman

(1976) reports predicted results on a variety of behaviors,
including thought process, feeling state, speech disorder,
non-verbal behavior, and sexual attraction.
The bulk of the earlier studies in this program were
directed towards investigating the role of aggressive wishes
and merging fantasies in schizophrenic symptomatology (summarized in Silverman, 1975).

A variety of aggressive and

\

neutral stimuli were used, e.g., a lion charging versus a
bird flying, man holding a dagger versus a man reading a
newspaper, and the verbal stimuli CANNIBAL EATS PERSON versus PEOPLE ARE WALKING.

Generally, the aggressive stimuli
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led to increased pathological behavior measured by Rorschach
content, TAT stories, word' associations, and a six-point
scale measuring "non-verbal pathological behavior"
inappropriate laughter) .

(e.g.,

Later studies suggested that the

effect was a delayed one (Silverman, 1971) and that it was
more reliably obtainable with long-term rather than shortterm schizophrenic patients (Silverman & Candell, 1970).
Other studies (e.g., Silverman, Spiro, Weisberg, &
Candell, 1969) report that subliminal presentation of the
message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE (a "symbiotic-gratification
fantasy")

led to a decrease in pathological behavior among

differentiated but not undifferentiated schizophrenics.
Silverman (1977) reports unpublished findings

(Kaplan, 1976;

Kaye, 1975} suggesting these amelioriative effects are
specific to this message as several closely related messages (e.g., MOMMY IS ALWAYS WITH ME) had no effect on
pathological behavior.

These results are interpreted to

support the hypotheses that symbiotic fantasy gratificatioL
reduces pathology in schizophrenics while activation of
aggressive fantasy intensifies pathological manifestations.
Further studies have investigated psychoanalytic
hypotheses relating specific stimulus content to depression,
homosexuality, stuttering, and competition.

Rutstein and

Goldberger (1973) found that presentation of aggressive
stimuli led to significantly higher self-ratings of depression but to no change in Rorschach measures of "aggression
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directed inward" among non-psychotic depressed patients.
Supporting the psychoanalytic hypothesis that homosexuality
involves (in part) a flight from incest, Silverman, Kwawer,
Wolitzky, and Coron (1973) found that stimuli containing
incestuous themes produced an increase in homosexual and a
decrease in heterosexual feelings reported by a group of
homosexual males.

In another study (Silverman, Klinger,

Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1.972), stuttering was found
to increase after subliminal presentations of anal content
as compared to neutral content.

Finally, Silverman, Ross,

Adle4mrl Lustig (1978) found competitive behavior (dart
throwing) was effected by oedipally-related stimuli that
either sanctioned or condemned the idea of defeating father.
For Silverman (1976, 1977), these results support particular psychoanalytic notions relating forms of pathology to
specific unconscious wishes and conflicts.
Noting that many of these results could be explained
by the generally negative affective quality of the various
stimuli rather than their specific meaningful content,
Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn (1976) tested new
groups of stutterers, homosexuals, depressives, and schizophrenics.

Each subject was subliminally exposed to three

sets of stimuli:

(a) the "relevant" wish-related stimulus

(aggressive for the schizophrenics and depressives, incest
for the homosexuals, and anal for the stutterers);

(b) an

I

"irrelevant" wish-related stimulus, but one that intensi-
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fied the symptoms of one of the other groups (incest for
schizophrenics and stutterers, aggressive for the homosexuals, and anal for the depressives); and (c) a neutralcontrol stimulus.

Three of the four groups showed sig-

nificant increases in pathology after exposure to their
"relevant" wish-related stimulus (depressives showed mixed
results).

In no instance did the "irrelevant" stimulus

influence the symptom under consideration.

These results

were interpreted as support for the psychoanalytic position
that symptoms have specific meanings and express an individual's struggle with a particular conflictual wish.
In other recent studies, subliminal presentations
of the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus have been shown to enhance the effect of various therapeutic modalities with
overweight women {Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn,
1978) and with insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger,
1974).

Silverman (in press) reports unpublished findings

(Parker, in preparation) that repeated exposures to this
stimulus as compared to a neutral one resulted in higher
exam scores for a group of college students.

In perhaps

his most provocative work to date, Silverman (1978a, in
press) uses these results and those obtained with oedipallyrelated stimuli to advance a thesis regarding the role of
unconscious fantasy in psychotherapeutic success.

In par-

ticular, he posits that certain therapies (e.g., systematic
desensitization, client-centered therapy, and meditation)
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are apt to activate symbiotic-gratification fantasies in
which the therapist is unconsciously perceived as the good
symbiotic mother.

Other therapies (e.g., Masters and

Johnson type sex therapy, body contact therapies, assertiveness training, and encounter treatment) are more likely to
activate fantasies of sanctioned oedipal gratification in
which the therapist is unconsciously experienced as a permissive superego figure.

In light of his research findings

on the effects of subliminal activation of these two fantasies, Silverman argues that their inadvertant activation
may play a significant role in the therapeutic success of
many forms of therapy.
In sum, Silverman and his associates have put together one of the most ambitious and voluminous research programs on subliminal perception to date.

More

th~n

twenty-

five studies have been published while an additional
thirty studies remain unpublished (Silverman, personal communication).

As noted above, these findings may have far-

reaching implications for understanding therapeutic processes (Silverman, in press} and for developing new therapeutic methods (e.g., Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn, 1978).

Purporting to validate psychoanalytic hypotheses

about symptom formation and unconscious motivation, the program may approach the "promise of a clinical-experimental
psychology of unconscious phenomena (Wolitzky & Wachtel,
1974, p. 840)" hoped for by earlier investigators.

f.

'..)I .•

Cer-
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tainly, the experimental results are not readily explained
by many modern perceptual and visual information-processing
theories (e.g., Neisser, 1967).

Given these implications

and the claims made by the researchers, the need for careful evaluation and independent replication is clearly indicated.

Some general criticisms reflecting on the validity

and reliability of the overall research program are discussed next.

This is followed by a description of a par-

ticular study with plans for a replication and extension
of it.
Perusal of individual studies suggests that experimental results are rarely straightforward and unambiguous.
This appears especially true for the hypotheses that have
been most extensively investigated.

For example, later

studies using aggressive stimuli with schizophrenics obtained inconsistent results that were explained in terms of
a "delayed effect" (Silverman, 1971) and differences
between long-term and short-term patients (Silverman &
Candell, 1970).

Greenberg (1977) also notes the lack of

consistency in effect across studies and complains that
Silverman shifted rather hastily from one measurement
technique to another without exploring in detail or depth
the limits of the various measures of effect.

In a similar

vein, Shapiro (1978) notes that studies of symbiotic
stimuli with schizophrenics have also obtained inconsistent
results in that significance tends to occur on one or another
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measure but rarely on all measures used in a study.

More-

over, the effects appear on different measures from study
to study.

Shapiro argues that this raises some questions

as to the nature of the effects and what underlies them.
Silverman (1978b) replies to this criticism claiming that
the common effect in these studies was greater adaptive
functioning after stimulation and that the fact that it is
found on different measures at different times raises questions for further research, but does not challenge the
basic thesis.

Silverman appears correct in asserting that

these inconsistent results raise further research questions.
His labeling the common effect as "greater adaptive functioning" however, ignores the direct challenge to replicability and reliability posed by these inconsistent results.
The reader also notes Silverman's tendency to invoke personality variables when accounting for inconsistent
or weak results (e.g., the "deniers" in Silverman, Bronstein, & Mendelsohn's [1976] sample of depressives).

Thou~h

these variables may well prove to be important and so
should be investigated, attention need also be paid to
specifying the range of stimulus conditions within
subliminal effects are obtained. 2
2

which

Given other reviewers'

.
G1ven
t h e present state of knowledge regar d.1ng
subliminal phenomena, it may be argued that it is most
appropriate to first establish the stimulus parameters for
which subliminal perception is reliably demonstrable, and
then to investigate the contributions of personality and
other mediating variables.
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(e.g., Dixon, 1971) emphasis on the small range of stimulus
values for which subliminal effects occur, Silverman's lack
of careful consideration here is somewhat surprising.

For

example, except for very recent reports (e.g., Silverman,
Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978), this reviewer found no studies
for which illumination levels were reported for both the
blank and stimulus fields.

Room illumination levels and

time given for subjects to adapt to tachistoscope lighting
before subliminal exposures are also notably lacking.
Finally, details on the construction, brightness, and contrast of stimulus cards are usually absent.

Beside pro-

hibiting conclusions about the stimulus range of subliminal
effects, these oversights make exact replication impossible.
In one attempted replication, Emmelkamp and Straatman
(1976) found that two of their twenty subjects could exactly
reproduce the experimental stimuli following 4-msec exposures.
Except for one footnote (Silverman & Spiro, 1967,
p. 329) referring to an earlier study {Silverman, 1966) in
which no significant differences were found between 4-msec
and 6-msec stimulus exposures, this reviewer found neither
empirical evidence nor rationale regarding the choice of
4-msec exposure speeds, durations between exposures {usually three seconds) or number of exposures {usually four).
Again, attention to and systematic variation of these
variables could significantly contribute to understanding
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what stimulus values underlie subliminal effects.

Similarly,

careful threshold determination procedures are rarely
reported in the studies.

Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig

(1978) do report threshold data obtained with one of the two
tachistoscopes used in their study, but fail to specify the
procedures used to collect the data.

As Eriksen (1960) and

others have noted, differing methods may obtain quite different threshold estimates.

Thus, Silverman's data give

little indication of how far below awareness the reported
phenomena are demonstrable.
Many of the criticisms and the results of Emmelkamp
and Straatman {1976) mentioned above raise a question regarding the possibility that partial cues were available
to subjects in some studies.

Silverman and Spiro (1967)

and Silverman {1968) offer data and persuasive arguments
against this possibility for {at least) many of their studies.
Particularly impressive is their report that subjects were
unable to discriminate between (without having to identify)
neutral and critical stimuli when presented under the conditions used in several experiments.

Unfortunately, the

discrimination task has not been administered to subjects
in all studies {e.g., Silverman, Frank & Dachinger, 1974).
Silverman (1976) marshalls further support against the
partial-cue hypothesis from several studies in which stimuli
were presented at both 4-msec and 10 second durations {e.g.,
Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973).

In none of the seven studies
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mentioned did supraliminal exposures lead to significant
changes in measured pathology while all obtained predicted
subliminal effects.

Though supportive of the subliminal

hypothesis, findings that subjects react differently to
completely available stimuli (or to different amounts of
part-cue availability) cannot disprove the partial-cue
hypothesis (Wiener & Kleespies, 1968).

As an overstated

example, one can easily imagine that subjects' reactions
to the part-cue "HI" might differ considerably from those
to the complete word "SHIT."
As some of the foregoing criticisms are applicable
to most or all of the studies considered, the strength and
reliability of the overall findings is called into question.

These methodological flaws also create doubt as to

whether the experiments are valid tests of the psychoanalytic hypotheses they are purported to test.

In this

regard, investigations testing the specificity of relationships between symptoms and stimulus content (Silverman,
Bronstein, & Mendelsohn, 1976) and those comparing the
effects of semantically related stimulus contents (reported
in Silverman, 1977) are most provocative in their support
for psychoanalytic hypotheses relative to other hypotheses.
Given these questions about the reliability of the
overall findings and the validity of the "subliminal psychodynamic activation" construct hypothesized to underlie the
results,

L~e

need for independent replication of any part
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of this research program is clearly apparent.

Silverman

(personal communication) lists nineteen studies completed
without his sponsorship.
published.

Only three of these have been

Rutstein and Goldberger's (1973) study of

depressives was completed while Rutstein was a graduate
student at New York University and obtained inconsistent
results.

The other articles (Greenberg, 1976; Emmelkamp

& Straatman, 1976) appear in journals published outside
the United States and essentially fail to replicate
Silverman's findings.

Greenberg (1976) compared the effects

of aggressive and neutral stimuli with schizophrenics.

His

only significant finding was an increase in a Rorschach
measure of pathological thinking following exposure of the
neutral stimulus, opposite Silverman's findings.

Emmelkamp

and Straatman (1976) found no subliminal effect with a
symbiotic gratification stimulus on snake phobics in an
attempted replication of Silverman, Frank, and
(1974).

Dachinger

Unfortunately, all of these replication attempts

suffer from many of the same methodological shortcomings
discussed with regard to the original studies.
The Present Study
In an effort to encouragereplication and to demon~trate

subliminal effects on a type of behavior not pre-

viously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978)
report results of four experiments using a relatively simple
behavioral measure and college males as subjects.

The major
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intention of each experiment was to manipulate, through
subliminal presentation of conflict-related material, the
degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects and to observe
the effects of this on subjects' accuracy in dart-throwing
competition.

Stimuli were chosen either to intensify

oedipal conflict by condemning the idea of defeating father
in competition or to alleviate the conflict by sanctioning
this idea.

The verbal message BEATING DAD IS OK was pre-

sented for the sanctioning condition, and BEATING DAD IS
WRONG was used for the condemning condition.

Each message

was presented following congruous pictures of an older and
younger man both smiling (sanctioning) or both frowning
(condemning).

Thus, the study purports to test the psycho-

analytic proposition that males can unconsciously inhibit
themselves in competitive performance because winning has
the hidden connotation of defeating father for mother's
love (Beisser, 1961).
In three of the four experiments, the results
obtained were consistent with the expectation that exposure
to the OK stimuli would enhance subsequent dart-throwing
accuracy while the WRONG stimuli would diminish it.

The

authors note that for these three groups, forty of seventyeight subjects (59 percent) obtained adjusted scores for the
OK condition that were over one hundred points greater than
their adjusted scores for the WRONG condition.

In contrast,

only one subject had a difference of this magnitude in the
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opposite direction.

For the experiment which failed to

obtain significant results, uncontrolled illumination
levels were blamed.
tion

A subsequent experiment varied

illQ~ina-

levels and found that stimuli exposed at higher levels

failed to produce effects even though stimuli were then
closer to threshold.

Results from a discrimination task

administered to most subjects following three of the experiments suggest that results cannot be attributed to the
availability of supraliminal partial cues. 3
The first part of the present investigation is an
attempted replication of the major parts of this study.
Additional information on procedure and copies of the stimuli
used in the original study were obtained (Silverman, personal communication).

In order to more clearly specify

stimulus conditions for which the effect occurs, ascending
threshold data is collected for use in generating the stimuli used in the experiment proper.

Apparent differences in

procedure are discussed in the appropriate context.
In order to better understand the psychological processes involved in this phenomenon, the second part of the
present study extends the original findings to investigate
which elements of the OK and WRONG stimuli are necessary to
produce the experimental effects.
3

Silverman (1976) acknowl-

unfortunately, the discrimination task was not
administered following Experiment I which used a threefield tachistoscope most similar to that used in the
present study.
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edges that many of his results could be explained by the
generally negative affective quality of the various stimuli
rather than by their specific psychoanalytically-meaningful
content.

Studies comparing the effects of several meaning-

ful stimuli on different clinical groups (Silverman, Bronstein, & Mendelsohn, 1978) and studies varying stimulus
content related to one theme (reported by Silverman, 1976)
have supported the specificity hypothesized by psychoanalysts.

The present study attempts to extend these findings

to the dart-throwing paradigm.

To test whether the specif-

ically oedipal elements of the original stimuli are necessary, reference to defeating father is eliminated from a
further set of stimuli.

Thus, the stimuli WINNING DARTS IS

OK and WINNING DARTS IS WRONG are presented with congruous
pictures and followed by dart-throwing.

Additionally,

reference to competition is eliminated and only a nonspecific behavioral injunction included.
stimuli YOU DO
are presented.

OK

For this, the

and YOU DO WRONG with congruous pictures

These procedures provide a partial test of

Silverman's hypothesis that activation of an unconscious
oedipal conflict is necessary to explain the original
results.

As a test of the specific relationship between

competitive behavior and oedipal conflict posited by psychoanalysts, the results also reflect on the construct validity
of the "subliminal psychodynamic activation" model.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects for the experiment were thirty-eight males
from the Loyola University Department of Psychology undergraduate volunteer pool.

Only subjects who spent their

childhoods in primarily English speaking homes were included
(Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978, p. 346).

Subjects

who wear (untinted) glasses or contact lenses for any
reason were required to wear them during all tachistoscopic
presentations (Silverman, personal communication).

Eighteen

of these subjects were randomly selected to complete the
second part of the study.

Prior to the actual experiment,

an additional ten subjects drawn from the same population
were used for piloting the procedure and for collection of
threshold data.

Subjects' ages ranged from 17 to 25 years,

with a mean age of 19.0 years and a-'rilode age of 19 years.
Materials
The experimental verbal stimuli for the replication
include:
OK.

(a) BEATING DAD IS WRONG, and (b) BEATING DAD IS

Each is printed in letters 1.3-cm high and occupies two
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lines on a white card.

The pictorial stimuli are 4 x 7-cm

line drawings intended to be congruous with the verbal messages.

Thus, for Stimulus a, the pictorial accompaniment

consists of a simple line drawing of older and younger male
figures looking at each other with lips turned downward,
clearly conveying negative feeling.

For Stimulus b, the

pictorial accompaniment is identical, except that the lips
are turned up, so that the figures appear to be smiling at
each other.

The baseline stimuli consist of (relatively)

neutral verbal messages and congruous pictures.
include:

They

(a) PEOPLE ARE SITTING, and (b) PEOPLE ARE

STANDING.

How these stimuli were generated from photo-

copies of the stimuli used in the original study will be
detailed after other materials are discussed.
As in Experiment I of the original study, the
stimuli are viewed through an electronically controlled
Scientific Prototype three-field tachistoscope (Model N1000).

The viewing distance is 1.3 meters.

The exposures

of verbal message and picture {each from different fields)
last 4-msec each.

The tachistoscope is set up so that when

the subject looks into the eyepiece, he sees the blank
field with red fixation dot, which goes off each time the
stimulus fields go on.

After the instructions "Ready, set,"

the picture field is exposed for 4-msec followed by the
blank field for three seconds followed by the verbal field
for 4-msec followed again by the blank field.

Then, with
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five seconds of the blank field passing after each pair of
exposures, this sequence is repeated three times, thus
giving four pairs of exposures for each condition.
For the dart-throwing competition, an Americanstyle dart board identical to that used in the original
study was hung 96 inches from the throwing line with the
bottom 58 inches from the floor.

The dartboard (manu-

factured by General Sportscraft of Bergenfeld, New Jersey)
is 18 inches in diameter and divided into seven equal concentric circles with the following point allotments:
20, 30, 40, 60, 80, and 100.

10,

One defect should be noted.

Part of the bullseye (the 100 point area) seems to be made
of hard wood which the metal darts cannot penetrate.

Thus,

darts hitting this area and bouncing away from the board
were scored as 100 points.

The dart-throwing area is

situated immediately adjacent to subject's seat for viewing
the tachistoscope (see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram").
Tachistoscopic illumination levels varied across
the original experiments and were not reported for Experiment I in which the three-field tachistoscope was used.
Silverman (personal communication) recommends however that
the illumination of the stimulus fields be set at between
four and five footlamberts with blank field and room illumination two to three times brighter than this. 4

Averaging

4Experiment II of the original study reports stimulus field illuminations of five footlarnberts with the
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these figures, stimulus field illuminations were set at 4.5
footlarnberts, and the blank field at 2.5 times brighter or
11.25 footlamberts.

Illumination measurements were made

using an Ilford photometer with experimental stimulus cards
inserted in the fields.

All fields were set at "constant-

on" positions while measurements were made. 5

Silverman

(personal communication) also notes that subjects' exposure
to glare from room lighting may interfere with subliminal
registration.

For this reason, room lighting was shielded

from subjects' direct view thereby eliminating the possibility that glare from the flourescent lighting could effect
results.

Room illumination was measured at 7.6 footlamberts.

This measurement was taken of the wall which subjects faced
when seated at the tachistoscope and when throwing darts
{see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram").

Finally, light re-

blank field at nine footlamberts. Experiment IV used stimulus fields at five. footlamberts with the blank field at
fifteen footlamberts. Both experiments used a two-field
tachistoscope and obtained the predicted effect.
5

It should be noted that after approximately half
the subjects had been run, a slight flickering appeared in
the stimulus fields when viewed in the "constant-on" position. All light bulbs were changed at this point and
illumination levels recalibrated. Unfortunately, the lowest
setting for the stimulus fields gave illumination readings
slightly higher than those used previously. They were set
at 5.1 footlamberts while the blank field remained at 11.25
footlamberts for the duration of the experiment. Additional
measurements taken near the end of the experiment showed no
more than an 8 percent variation from these figures, well
within the standard error of measurement of the instrument
at these illumination levels. Data obtained before and
after this change will be compared to determine the effect,
if any, of these slightly differing illumination levels.

47
fleeting from the tachistoscope housing immediately in front
of subjects• chair was measured at 11.2 footlamberts.
Lack of the original stimuli made their exact replication in terms of brightness, sharpness, and contrast
impossible.

Photocopies of the original stimuli were used

on three initial pilot subjects with stimulus fields set at
the illumination levels discussed above.

These stimuli met

the two criteria suggested in the original article (p. 343):
(a) all pilot subjects reported seeing flickers or flashes
of light on four successive exposures of each

verba~

and

pictorial stimuli, and (b) the flickers or flashes from
the two sets of oedipal stimuli could not be distinguished
from each other by any subject.

The original article (p.

352) also reports ascending threshold data collected for
two neutral stimuli.

For illumination levels approximating

those here, subjects' mean threshold for first reporting
anything was 40.2 msec, while mean threshold for correct
reading was 66.0 msec.

In contrast, pilot subjects in the

present study reported partial cues at

aro~~d

correctly read the stimuli at 20 to 25 msec.

15 msec and
In his most

recent statement, Silverman (personal communication)
recommends that stimuli be constructed so that partial
cues are available at about 30 msec and that correct reading
occur between 40 and 60 msec.

As the first stimuli tested

here clearly did not meet these recommendations and the
present illumination levels closely approximated those
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recommended by Silverman, the decision was made to progressively lighten these stimuli so that more comparable
threshold data could be obtained.
This was accomplished by photocopying with a piece
of tracing paper covering the stimulus cards.

This process

was repeated on resultant copies three times, so that three
gradations of lightness were obtained for each stimulus.
Six neutral verbal stimuli and one critical stimulus (YOU
DO OK) were copied in this fashion.

Following this, ascend-

ing threshold data for these 21 cards (7 stimuli x 3 lightness gradations) were obtained from 7 subjects drawn from
the population described above.

Illumination levels for

stimulus and blank fields were those to be used in the
experiment (i.e., 4.5 and 11.25 footlamberts respectively).
Subjects were instructed to report everything they saw,
whether a flash, a line, a letter, or a change in brightness, and to report all parts of the stimuli as they were
seen.

For each threshold determination, the subject was

given forty-five seconds exposure to the blank field (with
fixation dot), told "Ready," and then exposed to the stimulus for 4 msec.

Each stimulus exposure was followed by

four seconds of the blank field.

Stimulus exposure times

were increased by 2 msec increments until the subject first
reported a partial cue (e.g., a line, a letter) and then in
1 msec increments until a correct reading was made.
Threshold data with stimuli grouped according to lightness
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gradation are presented in Table 1.

Each mean reported is

based on from twenty-four to thirty-eight threshold

deter-

minations.
Mean threshold scores obtained from the lightest
group of stimuli (30.4 msec for first report ana 46.1 msec
for correct reading) most closely approximate the thresholds
recowmended by Silverman (30 msec and 40 to 60 msec, respectively).

On the basis of these results, all remaining

verbal and pictorial stimulus cards were lightened by the
process described above so that they approximated this
group of stimuli in terms of line thickness and contrast. 6
The stimuli do not appear to differ with regard to angularity.

(See Appendix B for photocopies of these stimuli

that were used in the experiment proper.)
Procedure for the Replication (Part 1)
A verbatim account of the experimenter's interaction
with subjects is provided in Appendix A-II.

This was

adapted with only minor variations from the account obtained from the original authors.

The major steps of the

procedure are described below.
6 These stimuli appeared dramatically lighter than
the ones originally obtained. Copies of two o£ these
lightened stimuli and a description of threshold data were
sent to Dr. Silverman. He replied that the stimuli appeared
no lighter than others he had used in two-field tachistoscope experiments. Further, he reminded the author that no
illumination measurements had been made in Experiment I of
the original experiment which used a Scientific Prototype
three-field tachistoscope comparable to the one used here.
This could clearly account for the observed differences.
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Table 1
Thresholds for Stimuli Grouped by Lightness Gradation
Light

Lighter

Lightest

Range

Mean

Range

Mean

Range

Mean

Threshold for
first report

14-40

24.5

16-38

27.2

20~46

30.4

Threshold for
correct reading

18-55

31.8

20-72

39.5

22-94

46.1

'

.

Note.

All figures are in msec.
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The thirty-eight subjects were randomly divided
between the two experimenters involved in the study.

When

each subject arrived, he was asked by the experimenter to
read an information sheet that explains the rudiments of the
experiment and assures confidentiality (see Appendix A-III).
He was then asked to sign a consent form (Appendix A-IV).
If the form was signed, the subject was told of the dartthrowing competition for which cash prizes o£ $12, $8, and
$5 would be awarded to the three highest scorers.

After a

brief explanation of the tachistoscope, the subject was
given the "priming" material identical to that used in the
original study.

This consisted of a brief questionnaire

(Appendix A-V) involving questions about the subject's relationships with his mother and father, Rorschach card IV
(the "father" card), TAT card 7BM (a "father-son'1 scene),
TAT card 6BM (a "mother-son" scene), and a story recall
task.

The latter involved the subject looking at TAT card

6BM while being read a story (Appendix A-VI) made up by the
original authors to contain prominent oedipal elements.
He then recalled the story and told it back to the experimenter.

The purpose of these procedures was to

11

prime" the

subjects for the oedipal content to be subliminally presented.

Silverman (1965) reports that for subliminal

effects to be obtained for normal subjectsr the mental content that the stimuli were intended to trigqer had to be
activated by priming beforehand.
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After eight practice dart throws, each subject was
put through the two conditions of the replication.

Each

condition consisted of tachistoscopic exposure to a baseline stimulus pair and a baseline assessment of dartthrowing (all eight darts were thrown by the subject and
then retrieved by the experimenter).

This was followed by

the tachistoscopic presentation of one o£ the two experimental oedipal stimuli already described and another eight
dart throws.

This was followed by the other condition, in

which pretest and posttest assessments of dart-throwing
were again collected.

The sequence of baseline conditions

remained fixed for all subjects, while the presentations of
the critical stimuli were randomized.
Procedure and Materials for
the Extension (Part 2)
Immediately upon completion of Part l, the eighteen
subjects run by the author received the procedure described
above with exposures to the four non-oedipal stimuli and
four additional baseline (neutral) stimuli.
stimuli were constructed to resemble

These new

(as mDch as possible)

the original stimuli in clarity, contrast, size, an9ularity,
and brightness.

Each stimulus was 9enerated by tracing

letters and figures used in the original stimuli.

To test

whether the oedipal elements of the original stimuli were
necessary, the following stimuli were presented:

(a) WIN-

NING DARTS IS OK and a picture of two male figures of the
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age with upturned (smiling) lips looking at each other,

and (b) WINNING DARTS IS WRONG and a picture of these two
young men looking with lips turned down (frowning) .

Refer-

ence to competition was eliminated in a further set of
stimuli:

(a) YOU DO OK and a picture of one smiling young

man, and (b) YOU DO WRONG and a picture of the same young
man frowning.

As mentioned earlier, all stimuli were

lightened so as to most closely match stimuli from which
recommended threshold data were obtainecl (Appendix C).
The baseline stimuli for Part 2 were ones used in
the original experiments.
gruent pictures) included:
(b) PEOPLE ARE TALKING,
PEOPLE ARE WALKING.

The verbal messages (with con(a) PEOPLE ARE THINKING,

(c) PEOPLE ARE

LOOJ~ING r

and

(d)

The baseline stimuli were presented

in the above sequence for all subjects.

As there are

twenty-four possible sequences in which the four new critical stimuli could appear, each subject was randomly assigned
to a different sequence.
The procedure for insuring that the experimenter
interacting with the subject was blind to stimulus content
should be mentioned here.

Before each subject appeared,

the co-experimenter randomly chose one o£ the twenty-four
possible orders for stimulus presentation.

He then placed

half of the stimuli (using all available stimulus holders)
face-down on a table (out of subject's sight) in order of
their presentation.

Before each tachistoscopic exposure,
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the subject was asked to look at the blank field (thus providing an approximate thirty second adaption period) while
the experimenter inserted the stimulus cards into the
fields in such a way as to avoid seeing their front-side.
Half-way through the procedure, it was necessary for the
co-experimenter to arrange the remaining cards in their
order of presentation.

Subjects were asked to look at the

blank field during this time and the experimenter temporarily left the room.

If for any reason, either experi-

menter or subject became aware of stimulus content, data
for that subject would have been discarded.

~his

did not

occur however.
Following presentation of the final critical stimuli
and subsequent dart throws, all subjects completed a discrimination task patterned closely after that described in
the original study (p. 346).

Each subject was given twenty

trials in which, under the same conditions as existed
during the experiment proper, he was aske4 to distinguish
the flickers made by one of the picture-message units from
those made by another.

The two BEATING DAD stimuli were

presented on one set of ten trials (in random order), while
a non-oedipal critical stimulus pair was pr€sented with the
PEOPLE ARE WALKING pair in another ten trials (Appendix
A-VII).
Finally, subjects were told that a report of experimental results, prize money, and a description of the sub-
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liminal content would be mailed to them at the end of the
experiment.

They had been requested to leave mailing

addresses on the questionnaire adrninisterea earlier.

If

at this point, any subject insisted on knowing the content
of the stimuli, they were revealed and the subject asked
to keep this information secret.

Other questions about the

experiment were answered and subjects were then encouraged
to contact the experimenter by phone at any time with any
further concerns or questions.

A summary of these pro-

cedures appears in Table 2.
Analysis of Data
Each subject received twelve dart scores (six critical and six baseline) based on the total of the eight darts
thrown following each stimulus exposure.
critical stimuli was assessed by

The effect of the

subtracti~g

each critical

dart score from the baseline dart score which had immediately
preceded it.

Matched-pairs t tests were computed to deter-

mine the significance of these (baseline minus critical)
difference scores.

All tests of significance were two-

tailed.
Results for the two BEATING DAD stimuli were analyzed together and separately for each experimenter

0

Addi-

tional t tests were planned to compare the mean difference
scores obtained by each experimenter for each critical
stimulus.

Thus, the presence of any differential experi-

menter effect could be assessed.

The effect of the small
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Table 2
Summary of Procedure
Part 1 (38 subjects divided between co-experimenters)
1.

Introduction and signing consent form

2.

Priming procedures

3.

Eight practice dart throws

4.

Baseline 1 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE SITTING)

5.

Baseline 1 dart throws (eight throws for each condition)

6.

Critical 1 stimulation (one of the BEATING DAD stimuli)

7.

Critical 1 dart throws

8.

Baseline 2 stimulation (PEOPLE

9.

Baseline 2 dart throws

AP~

STANDING)

10.

Critical 2 stimulation (the other BEATING DAD pair)

11.

Critical 2 dart throws

Part 2 (18 subjects run by the author}
12.

Baseline 3 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE TBINKING)

13.

Baseline 3 dart throws

14.

Critical 3 stimulation (one of the four non-oedipal
critical stimulus pairs)

15.

Critical 3 dart throws

(At this point, the co-experimenter arranged the remaining
·stimulus cards.)
TAL~ING}

16.

Baseline 4 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE

17.

Baseline 4 dart throws

18.

Critical 4 stimulation (another non-oedipal stimulus
pair)
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Table 2--Continued
19.

Critical 4 dart throws

20.

Baseline 5 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE LOOKING)

21.

Baseline 5 dart throws

22.

Critical 5 stimulation (non-oedipal stimulus)

23.

Critical 5 dart throws

24.

Baseline 6 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE WALXING)

25.

Baseline 6 dart throws

26.

Critical 6 stimulation (non-oedipal stimulus)

27.

Critical 6 dart throws

28.

Discrimination task

29.

Debriefing
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change in tachistoscopic lighting was also tested by comparing mean difference scores for each critical stimulus
obtained before and after this change.
Finally, Silverman (personal communication) has
suggested that the experimental effect obtained in the
original study may be of a rather short duration.
investigate this possibility, matched-pairs

~tests

To
were

planned for the BEATING DAD stimuli using only the first
four dart throws that followed each baseline and critical
stimulus exposure.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Results of the Replication
Means and standard deviations for dart scores
obtained following the two BEATING DAD stimuli and their
associated baseline stimuli are presented in Table 3.
Results are presented separately for each experimenter and
as combined for all thirty-eight subjects,

The results of

the matched-pairs t tests computed for these data are presented in Table 4.

These reveal that the only statistically

significant result obtained was for the author's subjects
following exposure to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus

(E <

.01~

2-tailed).

Dart scores increased significantly

here, a finding directly opposite that of the original
study.

Fourteen subjects showed increases in dart scores

following this stimulus while only four showed decreases,
X

2

(1) =.4.55, E < .05.

The co-experimenter obtained no

effect with the same stimulus.

When resuifs from both

experimenters are combined, neither of the oedipallyrelated stimuli had a significant effect an dart scores.
These results clearly fail to support Silverman's findings
on the effects of subliminal stimulation with these stimuli
59
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Table 3
Mean Critical and Baseline Dart Scores
For the Replication

Stimulus

Swanson
(n=l8)

Casas
(!:?_=20)

Combined
(~_==38)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Baseline
Mean

445.56

461.00

453.68

89.19

88.6J

88.05

Mean

437.22

468.50

453.68

so

102.83

108.35

105.53

Mean

419.44

458.00

439.74

so

120.71

128.42

124.67

465.00

451.0()

457.63

92.94

130. 34:

112.88

so
Critical

BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Baseline

Critical
Mean

so
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Table 4
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for the Replication
Swanson
(n=l8)

Stimulus

Casas

Combined

(~=:20}

(n=38)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Mean difference
SD of difference

8.33

7.50

0.00

102.97

64.72

84.18

0.343

t

0.51B

0.000

BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Mean difference
SD of difference·
t

-

45.55

7.00

65.64

80.20

2.944*

*E < • 01, 2-tailed •

0.390

-

17.89
77.40
1.425
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and, in one instance, are in the opposite direction of his
original findings.
Differences in results obtained by the two experimenters were assessed by

£ tests.

There was no difference

for the BEATING DAD IS OK stimulus, t(36)

=

0.558, ns.

In

contrast, the experimenters obtained significantly different
results with the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus, t(36)
2.137, E < .OS, 2-tailed.

=

This result suggests an experi-

menter or experimenter x subject interaction effect and
raises serious questions as to the generalizability of the
phenomenon.
As noted earlier, Silverman has raised the possibility that the experimental effect may be of a rather
short duration following subliminal stimulation.

That is,

the effect may be evident for only the initial dart throws
following each stimulus exposure.

Table 5 presents mean

differences '(between critical and associated baseline
scores) and matched-pairs t tests computed using only the
first four dart throws in each condition.

These results

are essentially the same as those obtained when all eight
dart throw scores are used.

No stimulus had a significant

effect on dart scores, though BEATING DAD IS WRONG
ap~roached

significance (E < .10, 2 -tailed) for the author's

subjects.

For this stimulus, the average increase of 29.44

points for four dart throws compared to the average increase
of 45.55 for all eight darts suggests that the obtained

63

Table 5
Matched-Pairs

.L.

1...

Test Results Using Only First

Four Dart Throws Following Each Stimulus Exposure
Swanson
(n=l8)

Stimulus

Casas
(!2_=20)

Combined
(~=38)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Mean difference

10.56

SD of difference

63.66
0.684

t

-

15.00

2.89

55.8J

60.27

1.201

0.296

BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Mean difference
SD of difference
t

- 29.44

0.50

- 14.21

57.55

69.92

65.17

1.741*

*E < .10, 2-tailed.

0. 032

1.344
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effect was fairly evenly distributed over the first four
and second four dart throws.

These results do not support

the hypothesis of a short-lived subliminal effect.
Finally, the effect of the small increase in
stimulus field illumination was examined.

Average differ-

ences (between critical and associated baseline scores)
obtained before and after the lighting change were compared using t tests.

None of these four (two experimenters

x two stimuli) tests approached significance.
Results of the Extension and
Discrimination Task
The two WINNING DARTS and two YOU DO stimuli and
associated baseline stimuli were subliminally presented as
a test of whether the specifically oedipal content of the
original stimuli were necessary to obtain an effect on dart
scores.

Summary statistics for the eighteen subjects ex-

posed to these stimuli are presented in Table 6.

Exarnina-

tion of Table 7 reveals that none of these £our critical
stimuli had a significant effect on dart scores, although
the \HNNING DARTS IS OK stimulus approached significance
(p < .10, 2-tailed).

Again, the direction of this near-

significant effect was surprising in that this stimulus
tended to lead to decreases in dart scores.

Similarly, the

WINNING DARTS IS WRONG stimulus tended to produce increases
in dart-throwing accuracy (£ < .20, 2-tailed).
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Table 6
Mean Critical and Baseline Dart Scores
for the Extension
Mean

SD

Baseline

466.11

61.56

Critical

435.56

95.38

Baseline

456.11

98.77

Critical

487.78

90.00

Baseline

4 3 3. 89

74.61

Critical

436.67

71.21

Baseline

451.11

111.56

Critical

463.33

86.57

Stimulus
WINNING DARTS IS OK

WINNING DARTS IS WRONG

YOU DO OK

YOU DO WRONG

Note.

N

=

18.
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Table 7
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for the Extension
Mean
Difference

Stimulus

SD of
Difference

t

30.55

70.50

1. 839

WINNING DARTS IS WRONG

-31.67

92.12

-1.459

YOU DO OK

- 2.78

85.74

-0.138

YOU DO WRONG

-12.22

114.05

-0.455

WINNING DARTS IS OK

Note.

N

=

18.

*p < .10, 2-tailed.

*

67
.

1
Seventeen of these eig1teen
sub Jects

7

were given a

discrimination task to test for the availability of partial
cues.

Of the 20 discriminations required, one subjectwas

correct 13 times, one subject 12 times, two subjects 11
times, five subjects 10 times, three subjects 9 times, one
subject 8 times, one subject 7 times} one subject 4 times,
and two subjects 3 times.

With a minimum of 14 correct or

incorrect discriminations comprising a nonchance performance (E

=

.10, 2-tailed), three subjects met this criterion.

These three made significantly more incorrect discriminations than expected however.
mean

nlli~er

For the group as a whole, the

of correct discriminations was 8.76 which did

not significantly differ from the expected 10 correct of 20
discriminations.

As the stimuli were presented under the

same conditions as existed during the experiment proper,
these results provide no support for the presence of partial cues.
7one subject complained of eye strain and was
excused from this task.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The major conclusion to be drawn from the present
study is that it failed to replicate any part o£ Silverman,
Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration of "subliminal
psychodynamic activation" with the dart-throwing paradigm.
This was true for both oedipally-related stimuli and for two
experimenters running separate groups of subjects.

To

appreciate the difference in results of the two studies, it
should be noted that the original authors (p. 354) report
that 86 percent (67 of 78) of their subjects produced
results in the hypothesized direction.

-In contrast, the

present study found only 42 percent (16 of 38) o£ the subjects prodt1ced hypothesized results, while 55 percent (21
of 38) had results in the opposite direction. 8

Furthermore,

the only significant result obtained here was limited to
one experimenter and was a reversal o£ the results o£ the
original study.
Before discussion of this result and those £or the
8 These percentages were derived by comparing the
relative magnitude of difference scores (baseline minus
critical) for the two BEATING DAD stimuli obtained by each
subject. One subject obtained equal difference scores so
percentages do not total one hundred.
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non-oedipal critical stimuli, possible explanations for
this failure to replicate are considered.

These include

differences in procedure and materials, subject groups, or
experimenters.

Procedurally, every attempt was made here

to replicate the original study as exactly as possible.

In

both studies for example, the experiment was called "Tournament" on subject sign-up forms.

The same kind of tachis-

toscope and dart board were used.

Durations and frequencies

of stimulus exposures were those reported by Silverman.
Room and stimulus field illuminations were within the range
of those reported for the original experiments. 9

Further,

stimulus materials were generated from copies of the original stimuli with the help of frequent consultation with
Dr. Silverman.

Ascending threshold data collected for the

stimuli used here met the specifications of the original
author.

Finally, data collected from the discrimination

tasks were quite similar and support the absence of partial
cue availability in both studies.

Though slight or non-

obvious differences in equipment and stimuli were nonetheless present despite these

precautions~

i t is unclear

how they might account for the radically Bifferent results
obtained in the two studies.
9 The present experimenters may in fact have been more
meticulous than the original authors in specifying the
methods for obtaining illumination measurements and in
taking repeated measurements throughout the course of the
experiment (see METHODS). The original stuay does notreport measurement methods, gives only one illumination
reading for each experiment, ana fails to report any pertinent data for one experiment.
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The introduction and priming stages of the experiments were almost identical for the two studies.

One

noticeable difference however was the mention here of the
"co-worker [who] will come in and change the cards
(Appendix A-II)."

In the original study, stimulus cards

were previously coded and then arranged £or each subject
by the experimenter according to a list.

In an effort to

better ensure that the experimenter remained blind to
stimulus content, a second experimenter was introduced to
arrange the cards in the present study.

Of course, this

second person did not enter the room until after the replication part of the experiment was completed, so that any
differential effect must have been due solely to the mention of this procedure in the experimenter's introductory
remarks (see Table 2).
Differences in subject groups are always possible
and could account for the differing results.

Available

demographic data show that subjects' ages were almost
identical

(mean age of 19.0 here and 19.3, 19.6 1 and 19.5

for the original experiments).

In both studies, all sub-

jects were college males and most were from introductory
psychology classes.

Subjects whose native language was

not English were excluded.

As Loyola University enrolls

a large proportion of Catholic students, differences in
subjects' involvement in religion must be considered.
example, religious involvement or history may in part

For
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determine personal meanings given to the words "ok" and
"wrong."

One can further speculate that the word "dad"

may evoke special meaning for Catholic males if it is
associated with the more religious "father."

Along these

lines, Silverman (personal communication) has noted that
there may be regional differences in how subjects understand the word "beating."

The word may connote physical

attack, defeating in competition, fatigue or exhaustion,
cheating or circumventing, or possibly the lifestyle of
Jack Kerouac.

Words such as "defeating," "winning over,"

or "whupping" may more clearly communicate the intended
meaning for different subjects.

Unfortunately, no data

are available for either group of subjects that could shed
light on the possible relevance of subjects' religious
involvement or idiosyncratic and associative meanings
given to stimulus words.

10

The contributions of these

variables remains a question open to further research.
Finally, differences in the experimenters need be
considered.

Three male experimenters ranging from twenty

years to early thirties in age obtained the predicted
results in the original study.

In the present study, two

male experimenters, ages twenty-four and twenty-six, failed
10 Along with the letter to subjects discussing
results and stimulus content, the author plans to send a
questionnaire inquiring as to the kind and extent of
religious involvement of subjects both at present and as
children, the term used to refer to their fathers, and the
meaning they give to the word "beating. ••
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to obtain the predicted results.

Though differences in

appearance, manner, or personality may have differentiated
the two groups of experimenters, it is difficult to understand how they could have systematically affected subjects'
responses to stimuli of which the experimenters were unaware.

Clearly, one can only speculate as to how experi-

menter characteristics interacted with subliminally presented stimuli to change the unconscious meaning of the
situation for subjects.
Differences in methods, materials, subjects, and
experimenters between studies can never be completely
eliminated.

Given the present experimenters' careful

attempts at replication however, there are clearly no
obvious or straightforward reasons explaining the radically different results obtained.

Thus, the present

results suggest, at minimum, that the predicted effect is
not "reliable and powerful" as described by the original
authors (p. 354).

Rather, it is more probable that the

original effect was dependent on highly specific and
unknown situational, subject, or experimenter variables.
In this case, the original effect may be more accurately
characterized as fragile and lacking generalizability.
In the second part of the present stucly, four additional stimuli were presented to eighteen subjects in an
attempt to determine which elements of the oedipallyrelated stimuli were necessary to affect dart scores.

None
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of these stimuli produced a significant effect 1 although
WINNING DARTS IS OK approached significance.

Here, the

direction of effect was opposite expectation as this stimulus produced average decreases of thirty points in dart
scores.

Similarly, the stimulus WINNING DARTS IS WRONG

was followed by increases of over thirty points.

Along

with the significant reversal of original effect obtained
in the replication attempt, these results (though only suggestive) p9int to the hazards of predicting the kinds of
effects produced by subliminal stimulation.

The observed

relationships between stimulus content and effect could not
have easily been predicted by psychoanalytic theory or more
common sense notions.

Pine's (1964) notion of "indirect"

effects which are not logically or obviously related to
stimulus content appears pertinent here.

In addition, the

fact that these results did not reach significance further
highlights the fragile nature of subliminal effects in the
dart-throwing paradigm.
Perhaps the most provocative result of the present
study is the finding that for the author's subjects,
BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to increases in dart scores

(£ < .01, 2-tailed).
the original study.

This is a reversal of findings in
Additionally, this stimulus produced

no significant dart-score changes for the co-experimenter's
.
11
sub Jects.
11

Given that both experimenters followed iden-

As noted earlier, the experimenters obtained sig-
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tical procedures, were blind to stimulus content and that
subjects were randomly divided between them, this result
is not easily explained.

Evidence bearing on the possi-

bility of an experimenter effect, subject group differences,
and random error are considered next.
The two groups of subjects

here had almost identical

ages (means of 18.9 and 19.0 years) and were largely college
freshmen and sophomores.

In an effort to identify any pos-

sibly relevant subject variables, data from the questionnaire, Rorschach, TAT, and story recall task

collected as

part of "priming," were informally analyzed at the conclusian of the experiment.

These data suggested large varia-

tions between subjects on dimensions loosely labeled "defensiveness," "amount of oedipal content," "performance
anxiety," and "guilt manifestations."

A sorting of proto-

cols on the basis of these variables failed to reliably
differentiat~

between subjects run by either experimenter,

or subjects who attained the predicted results from those
who obtained reversals.

Thus, this informal, post hoc

analysis revealed no systematic differences between the
subject groups.

As noted earlier, variability in subjects'

religious involvement or in idiosyncratic meanings associated with the stimulus words may have mediated the difnificantly different results with this stimulus, !(36)
2.137, E < .05, 2-tailed.

=
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fering results for the two groups.

12

No data are available

which could aid in determining whether the subject groups
differed in other variables possibly related to subliminal
stimulation effects, e.g., hemisphericity (Sackeim, Packer,

& Gur, 1977), visual information processing speeds
(Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978), state of
arousal (Dixon, 1971), and level and type of drive-activation (Klein & Holt, 1960).
Any of these (or other unknown) subject variables
could have acted directly or interacted with some difference between the two experimenters to produce the obtained
results.

In an attempt to assess this last possibility, the

two experimenters ran each other through the replication
procedures following the conclusion of the experiment.
Though minor differences in manner, inflection, and pace were
observed, it was difficult to imagine that these were
responsible for the experimental results.

It can also be

noted that the experimenters are about the same age, dress
in much the same style, and bear few striking dissimilarities in physical appearance.

As none of these readily

observable variables appears to clearly differentiate the
two experimenters, one may speculate that the two may have
been perceived differently on an unconscious level due to
12 nata obtained from the subject questionnaire discussed earlier will be analyzed for subject group differences.
Any variable that appears to do so can be used as a predictor of subliminal effect in future research.
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subtleties of communication and personality.

For example,

it may have occurred that subjects perceived the author and
thus the experimental situation in such a way that the
BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus was unconsciously experienced
as a punishment which expiated guilt.

This relief of guilt

may have operated as a release leading to improved competitive performance. 13

This explanation is

clearly only

one of many possible speculations and is quite loosely
based on psychoanalytic notions of oedipal guilt and expiation.

Further, the mechanisms mediating such a phenomenon

are generally unknown making any test of the hypothesis
difficult to envision.
The preceding discussion makes evident the difficulty of explaining why the effect of the BEATING DAD IS
WRONG stimulus attained significance for one experimenter
and not for the other, and why its direction was opposite
that found by three previous experimenters.

None of the

l)I n t eres t.1ng1 y, th ere 1s
. some ev1. d ence suggest1ng
.
,
a general tendency for the author's subjects to improve
dart scores following exposure to any of the three stimuli
containing the word "wrong." Ignoring baseline scores for
the moment, examination of Tables 3 and 6 reveals that mean
dart scores following WRONG stimulation are greater than
scores following their respective OK stimuli (by 27.78
points for the BEATING DAD pair, 52.22 for WINNING DARTS,
and 26.66 for YOU DO). Another way to demonstrate this
tendency is to compare overall mean difference scores
(baseline minus critical} for the three OK stimuli to those
obtained for the WRONG stimuli (Tables 4 and 7). Again,
WRONG stimuli led to significant increases relative to
changes following OK stimuli, t(52) = 2.462, p < .02, 2tailed. The significance of this finding is unclear.
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possibilities mentioned are compelling for their evidence,
logic, or parsimony.

Perhaps a more credible explanation

is that the result is due to random error, despite having
attained statistical significance.

That is, it may repre-

sent a Type I error in which the null hypothesis is falsely
rejected.

In any experiment, the liklihood of a Type I

error increases as many statistical tests (t tests here)
are applied to the data.

This explanation has the value

of additional parsimony as the results of the two experimenters here could then be considered consistent and the
problem posed by the reversal of effect would be eliminated.
Clearly, this possibility can be tested by a future replication of the significant parts of the present study.
Whether or not the significant result is a replicable phenomenon, the present study creates doubt regarding
the generalizability of the original findings and the
theoretical rationale advanced to explain them.

Given the

care taken to replicate the original study as exactly as
possible, these results suggest that the findings of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) may have been dependent
on highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or
experimenter variables.

The reversal of effect for one

stimulus and the results for the non-oedipal stimuli raise
questions as to Silverman's (1976) assertion that subliminal
stimulation can directly activate unconscious wishes or
conflicts leading to predictable behavioral consequences.
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As noted earlier, the only published independent replication attempts of Silverman's work (Greenberg, 1977i Emmelkamp & Straatman, 1976) also obtained negative results.
Though these two studies contained many of the same methodological flaws as the original experiments, the continued
inability of independent investigators to successfully
replicate raises serious questions as to the strength of
the results of Silverman's overall research program.

Con-

trary to the assertions of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and
Lustig (1978, p. 354), subliminal effects do not appear to
be strong and reliable even when experimental stimuli,
subjects' motivational state, and type of response measure
are (apparently) congruent.

As in the 1950s and 1960s,

subliminal perception appears to be an ambiguous phenomena
that is not easily demonstrable (Eriksen, 1960i Wolitzky &
Wachtel, 1973).
In conclusion, possible reasons for the inability
of researchers to consistently demonstrate subliminal
effects are briefly considered.

Within the psychoanalytic

framework, many studies have been designed from somewhat
simplistic theoretical notions.

Silverman's work (1976),

for example, appears based on the assumption that a complex verbally coded message can bypass usual defensive operations to directly affect significant unconscious fantasies
or conflicts.

This assumption appears to ignore the com-

plex nature and purposes attributed to defense mechanisms
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by psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., A. Freud, 1936/1966).
It is also difficult to envision how stimulus content
could have such a direct and specific effect on unconscious
processes.

The mechanisms underlying translation of a

verbal or simple pictorial message into something impacting
on primary-process or unconscious events are given scant
attention by Silverman and other researchers.

This casts

doubt on the validity of the "subliminal psychodynamic
activation" paradigm as a method for testing psychoanalytic
hypotheses.
Finally, subjects differ on variables which may
mediate subliminal effects.

For example, rates of processing

briefly presented verbal information show large individual
differences (Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978).
Similarly, one might expect large individual differences
in the amounts and ways that information is processed when
presented sublimina·lly.

This would make difficult the

task

of establishing stimulus parameters for which all (or most)
subjects could show subliminal effects.

Individual dif-

ferences might also be expected in subjects' defensive
organization and the meanings given to stimulus materials.
Thus, stimulus content that has a significant emotional or
unconscious wish-related impact for one subject may be
affectively neutral for another.

Related to this is the

psychoanalytic notion that individuals differ widely in the
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ways that unconscious wishes or conflicts are consciously
experienced and behaviorally expressed (Fenichel, 1945).
This may help to explain why subliminal effects are difficult to predict for a group of subjects.

In light of

these considerations, a more open-ended, exploratory
approach to research on subliminal perception is recommended for the present.
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I.

Room Diagram
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II.

Details of Experimenter-Subject Interactions

Before S arrives: Turn on tach.
tion levels. Arrange materials.

Adjust times and illumina-

When S arrives:
"I'm
and as you may know this is a
study of factors that influence competitive performance.
We can begin by your reading this information sheet."
[Show S information sheet, have him sign consent form, then
say] "In addition to what was described on there, I want to
add that the tournament part of the experiment will involve
your throvling darts at. the dart board up there. Before we
get to that, however, let me explain about this equipment
here."
Reassurance about tach:
"The equipment here is called a
tachistoscope, and will be used in the experiment. It. can
regulate p~ecisely the amount of time a picture or message
can be flashed and seen. In this experiment we will be
flashing messages or pictures at a speed of four onethousands of a second, a speed at which you would probably
be aware only of a brief flash or flicker of light. The
messages or pictures should register in your mind however,
and after the experiment you will have an opportunity to
find out about the content of the stimuli you were shovm.
Do you wear corrective lens for any reason?"
[If so, be
sure Swears them during tach exposures.]
Questionnaire:
"Now I would like you to fill out this questionnaire."
[Be sure S includes his mailing address.]
Rorschach Card 4:
"Now I am going to show you an ink blot,
and I want you to tell me what you imagine you see. There
are no right or wrong answers. Different people imagine
different kinds of things. If you should see more than one
thing in the card, then tell me everything it looks like to
you."
[Do inquiry as to location only and allow no more
than 8 responses.]
TAT Card 7 BM:
"Now I am going to show you a picture, and
I would like you to make up a story about the picture, having
a past, present, and a future or outcome."
[Inquire into
outcome if not spontaneously given.
Inquire if an emotional
description is used that is unclear.]
TAT Card 6 BM:
"Now I am going to show you another picture,
and I would like you to make up a story about the picture,
having a past, present, and a future or outcome."
TAT Story (to Card 6 BM) and Recall:
"Now I am going to
read you a story we made up for the purpose of this experi-
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ment about this picture, and I will ask you to recall it
back to me after I finish reading it."
[Read story.]
"I would like you to recall the story as best you can, and
tell it back to me."
Explanation of Tournament:
"Okay, now we come to the
tournament. As you can see, the top places so far are
listed over here. The top three places in the tournament
will receive cash prizes of $12, $8 and $5.
I am going to
have you throw a total of 96 darts. You will throw 12
series of 8 darts, and before each series you will sit down
and look into the tach. Your grand score will count in the
tournament. Before I give you the instructions about that,
why don't you step over there and throw eight practice
darts? Stand behind that line and throw all eight darts.
Make sure you throw them hard enough so they stick. If a
dart doesn't stick in, or if it falls out, your score for
that throw will be zero. However, if a dart falls out of
the bullseye, it will count as 100 points."
[S throws
eight darts. After each series of eight darts, return
darts to table next to S.)
Tournament Procedure:
"Now I want you to sit in that chair
and look into the tach.
I will be at the contols over here,
and I will say 'Ready, set' and then press a button whLch
will produce two flickers of light three seconds apart.
After seeing several flashes you will get up, walk to the
line, and throw a series of eight darts. Then you will sit
down and look into the tach again.
In a while, my coworker will come in and change the cards being put into the
tach. That way, neither of us will know exactly what is
being shown.
If you have any questions, hold them until
the end of the experiment, and we can discuss ·them then.
Now, look into the tach. Do you see a red dot? Okay, try
to focus on that. During the time we are doing this part
of the experiment, try not to blink, and don't look up
from the machine.
I will show you a set of flashes, wait
a few seconds, then show you another set. You will see
four sets of flickers in all. Okay. Ready, set • • • "
[After first few sets of flashes, ask] "Did you see any
flickers? Tell me what you saw."
[Then instructS to
just tell you if they don't see any flickers.]
Discrimination Task:

[See instruction sheet.]

Debriefing:
"We are finished now. As I told you at the
beginnlng, our interest in this experiment was to see
whether your dart throwing could be effected by the subliminal messages you were receiving. What we plan to do

93
at the end of this experiment is to send a letter to all of
our subjects and tell you what the results of the study were.
We will also tell you the exact messages that you subliminally receivad. We would prefer to wait until everybody has been run through the study before revealing to
anyone what the subliminal stimuli are.
Is that alright
with you?"
[If s insists on knowing at this time what the
stimuli are, reveal them to him and ask him to keep this
information secret.]
"If you think of any other questions
or have any other concerns related to this study, feel free
to contact me at any time at the number listed on the
scheduling card."
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III.

Information about "The Effect on
Competitive Performance Through
Subliminal Presentation of Conflictual and Non-Conflictual
Stimuli"

There are many things which affect a person's competitive performance. One important group of factors, we
believe, is the way in which people see, and/or remember
faint or indistinct experiences.
By experimentally studying
this group of factors in people involved in competitive
situations we hope to better understand how performance may
be hindered or improved.
If you decide to participate in this study you will
be asked to throw darts at a dartboard, answer some questions, make up short stories, and look at quickly flashed
lights which will be words or pictures. From past experience with these or similar procedures we expect no ill
effect to you. Also, we expect to learn a great deal about
how competitive performance is affected, which, hopefully,
will be useful one day in helping people in various realms
of endeavor.
You do not have to participate in this study, and
if you do agree to participate you can still change your
mind at any time and withdraw from this study. Your decision will in no way be held against you. This is simply a
research study. All information will remain strictly confidential.
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IV.

Standard Consent Form
Please Read carefully Before Signing

I have agreed to participate in the experiment
"Tournament" and hereby give my consent to be a subject.
The experimenter has explained the procedures of the
experiment to me and has described discomforts or inconveniences I may be subjected to, if any.
I understand
that my responses will be kept in the strictest of confidence and anonymity.
I have the option to withdraw
from this experiment at any time and I also have the
right to request that my responses not be used.

Exper1menter's Signature
SUBJECT'S SIGNATURES
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V.

Priming Questionnaire

Name

Age

----

Address ______________________________________________________

. . .- - -Married? ---Parent----

Level of Education - - -G p A
Father's Occupation

-------Your

Occupational Goal

-----

By circling the appropriate letter please indicate
to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements below.
a)
b)
c)
d)

strongly agree
agree
disagree
strongly disagree

A.

I am a competitive person.
a b c d

B.

I would rather be "alone, at the top" than part of the
masses.
a b c d

C.

I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with my
mother.
a

D.

b

c

d

I am close with my mother.
a

b

c

d

E.

I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with my
father.
a b c d

F.

I am close with my father.
a

G.

b

c

d

It is difficult for me to be assertive with other people.
a

b

c

d

H.

I am prone to feel guilty about things more than most
people.
a b c d

I.

Most people would consider my father a success.
a

J.

b

c

d

I consider my father a success.
a b c d
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VI.

Story for Story Recall
(to Card 6 BM)
(LetS look at card while listening to the story.)
This is a mother and her son standing there in a

state of stunned silence.

Just moments before, the father

was also there, but he has stormed out of the room feeling
extremely angry towards his son.

They had had a loud argu-

ment in which the son told his father that he was no longer
competent to run the family business, that he should retire,
and that he (the son) should take over.

Since the mother

plays an important role in the running of the business,
this would give the son an opportunity to fulfill a longharbored secret wish of his:

to spend more time with her

and enjoy more often the closeness they've shared in the
past.

In his anger at being criticized by his son, the

father ostracized the son and threatened to exclude him
altogether from the family business.
of the room he cautioned:
father around here."

As he stormed out

"Just remember who's still the

The son is now feeling guilty and

fears that he may have overstepped his bounds.

He is also

afraid that he has threatened the closeness which he and
his father often experienced together.

The mother is torn

between her love for her husband and her love for her son.
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VII.

Discrimination Task

"Okay, there's just one more thing we're going to do. I have
two sets of cards here and I want to see whether you can tell
them apart when I flash them on at the same speed I did
during the experiment. Try as hard as you can because the
person who does the best on this will win a $5 cash prize.
I am going to show you four pairs of exposures of one set
of slides, which will be followed by four pairs of exposures of either the same set or a different set. After the
second set of four exposures and after each set after that
I want you to tell me whether you think the set you just
saw was the same or different than the set right before it.
You will be comparing each set of exposures to the set you
saw right before it. Okay, now if you would put your eyes
up against the viewer, we can get started. During this
task, please don't look up; keep your eyes focused into the
machine. Here's four exposures of the first set (exposures}.
Now I'm going to show you four more exposures of either the
same or a different set. Just say 'same' or 'different' to
indicate what you think (exposures). Now for another four
exposures and tell me if they are the same as or different
than the one you just saw (exposures)." Continue, following
the order of trials in column I below.
"Now we're going to do the same thing with another two sets
of cards. Here are four exposures of the first set {exposures). Now here are four exposures of another set and
like before you say 'same' or 'different' {exposures)."
Follow the order of trials in column II below.
Give the ten trials in column I utilizing the BEATING DAD IS
OK and BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli pairs. Then give the
ten trials in column II utilizing the PEOPLE ARE WALKING and
one of the additional critical stimuli pairs (e.g., YOU DO
OK stimuli pair). Be sure to show both the verbal and
the pictorial stimuli for each set of exposures.
N.B. When you put in the same stimulus be sure to pull it
out of the chamber and put it in again so that S is not
cued by the sound of what you are doing as to whether the
next exposures will be "same" or "different." Also, attempt
to shield the pictorial stimuli from S's view when putting
it into the b"3. ch.
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